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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DARRELL L. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appellant 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The general framework of Appellant's statement 
of facts is correct as far as it goes, but there are many 
important omissions, particularly omissions regarding 
events occurring immediately preceding the collision in 
which the Respondent sustained his injuries. For this 
reason the facts concerning these events are restated 
so that one complete picture may be presented. 
The eye-witness's testimony concerning the collision 
comes primarily from Karen Wright, who was riding 
in the front seat of the automobile operated by the 
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Appellant. She testified that shortly before reaching 
the town of Ovid, where the car made a 90° turn, that 
she asked the Appellant to slow down, and the Appellant 
replied as follows : "You're nervous, aren't you?" Wit-
ness said, "Yes," and the Appellant then said, "How 
many times do you think I've driven this road f" (112). 
Further evidence of :Miss Wright's concern over the 
manner in which Appellant was operating his auto-
mobile and his disregard to her warnings to him is 
apparent by the statements she made to one of the 
persons who removed her from the overturned car. 
Witness Larry J aussi testified as follows: "I heard 
Miss Wright when we got her out from under the car-
she says, 'I told hiln to slow down, but he wouldn't listen 
to me.' " (86) Miss Wright also testified that shortly 
following her warning to the Appellant, that the auto-
mobile rounded a sharp curve in Ovid, which was about 
three miles north of the scene of the collision, that as 
the Appellant rounded this curve he had to apply his 
brakes, and that the car left the oiled portion of the 
road and went out onto the gravel at the side of the 
road (111). 
After rounding the curve at Ovid, :Miss \Yrig:1t 
observed the speedometer to indicate a speed of 70 MPH, 
and she stated that she was apprehensive and nervous 
about the manner in which the auton1obile was being 
operated (112-113). 
About two city blocks ahead of Appellant's car 
Miss Wright observed the tractor pulling the hay-rack 
c01ne onto the highway. She thought the Appellant 
also observed the tractor and hay-rack, but when she 
C) 
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noticed the Appellant was maintaining the same high 
rate of speed, she screamed, "Look out!", and then 
the car crashed into the hay-rack (114). 
Other evidence in regard to the collision comes from 
Sheriff :Monson, who was the investigating Officer, and 
who testified that the impact apparently came on the 
right rear corner of the hay-rack, and that the Appel-
lant's car then proceeded forward under the hay-rack 
(14, 74). The Sheriff further stated that there was no 
indication that the Appellant applied his brakes or laid 
down any skid marks prior to the impact (14). Follow-
ing the impact, the evidence indicates that the Appel-
lant's car overturned several times in the air ( 84) and 
then came to rest 235 feet 7 inches from where the 
rear end of the hay-rack stopped (48). There is evidence 
that the tractor and the hay-rack stopped almost im-
mediately upon impact (84). 
Deputy Sheriff Ramey, who assisted Sheriff ~Ion­
son in the investigation, testified that a car approaching 
the scene of the collision from the direction Appellant 
was travelling would have an unobstructed view ahead 
for thirty-five hundreths of a mile (76, 77), that an 
object such as a tractor and a hay-rack could be observed 
for fifty-five one hundreths of a mile back from the 
point of where the collision occurred (78). Deputy 
Ramey further testified that the hay-rack and the tractor 
did not obstruct the left half of the highway at the time 
of the impact as contended by Appellant in his statement 
of facts (74, 75, 76). 
To briefly summarize the foregoing testimony of 
the witnesses and the physical evidence, the following 
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evidence exists: The. tractor and the hay-rack pulled 
onto the highway from a farm lane to the west of the 
highway and were travelling at a speed of from 4 to 
5 MPH, at a time when the Appellant was about two 
city blocks to the North. At that tiine the Appellant 
had a clear view of the tractor and the hay-rack with 
no obstruction of any kind between his car and the 
hay-rack. Appellant continued his speed of approxi-
mately 70 MPH without application of brakes sufficient 
to make brake marks, skid marks, or any other evidence 
on the highway of attempting to slow down the auto-
mobile. The Appellant apparently continued his speed 
right up to the point where he came to the hay-rack, 
and then he attempted to pass the tractor and the hay-
rack by turning out onto the narrow shoulder on the 
right-hand side of the roadway, although the evidence 
is clear that the left half of the roadway was unobstruc-
ted at that time. As Appellant attempted to pass the 
hay-rack, he struck its right rear quarter, passed under 
the right side of the hay-rack, left the highway, over-
turned in the air several ti1nes, and his automobile came 
to rest in the barrow pit upsidedown 235 feet dmvn the 
road. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE 
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT THE APPELLANT 
WAS GUILTY OF A "RECI{LESS DISREGARD" OF 
THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT. 
POINT II 
IT IS PRESU~IED THAT THE JFRY OBEYED 
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THE INSTRUCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DISREGARD THE REl\fARE:S TO WHICH APPEL-
LANT TOOK EXCEPTION, AND IT WAS A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO DENY MISTRIAL. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS, 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, AND 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPERLY 
DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
THE VETERANS AD~fiNISTRATION WAS NOT 
A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND NEED NOT 
BE NAl\fED AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF. 
POINT V 
IT WAS ENTIRELY PROPER FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO ADl\fiT EVIDENCE RELATING TO RE-
SPONDENT'S OBLIGATION, IN THE EVENT OF 
HIS RECOVERY FROM THE APPELLANT, TO 
PAY THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FOR 
MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED HIM IN THE 
VETERANS HOSPITAL. 
POINT VI 
CONSIDERING THE PERl\fANENT NATURE 
OF THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY RESPONDENT, 
THE DAl\fAGES AWARDED ARE NOT EXCES-
SIVE, AND THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OF THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRA-
TION HOSPITAL BILL. 
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POINT VII 
POLICE OFFICER ALVIN W. FOULGER WAS 
PROPERLY QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WIT-
NESS, AND HIS EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS EN-
TIRELY MATERIAL AND RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES OF THE CASE. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT'S INSTRL"CTIONS TO THE JURY 
PROVIDED THE JURY WITH A FAIR AND 
LEGALLY CORRECT BASIS FOR CONSIDERING 
AND DELIBERATING UPON ALL ISSUES OF THE 
CASE. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE 
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT THE APPELLANT 
WAS GUILTY OF A "RECKLESS DISREGARD" 
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDE~T. 
Respondent concedes that he was obligated to meet 
the requiren1ents of the Idaho Code, and further that 
the Idaho Guest Statute is the law which is applicable 
to this case. Respondent further admits that the only 
portion of the Idaho Statute with which we are con-
cerned here is whether or not the conduct of the appel-
lant amounted to .. reckless disregard". Appellant has 
called the attention of the court to the definitions of the 
Idaho Guest Statute as set forth in Foberg vs. Harrison, 
71 Ida. 11, ~~5 P. 2d 69, (1950), and ~llason vs .. Mootz, 
73 Ida. 461, 253 P. 2d ~40, (1953) Respondent feels 
that the following definitions fr01n Dazcson rs. Salt Lake 
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Hardware Co., 64 Ida. 666 at page 667, 136 P. 2d 733 
at page 738, as quoted with approval in Hughes vs. 
Hudelson, 67 Ida. 10, 169 P. 2d 712, (1946), further 
explains the interpretation placed upon the Idaho Guest 
Statute by the Idaho Supreme Court, wherein the court 
stated as follows at pages 716 and 717: 
"It is evident, to my mind, that the Legis-
lature by the Ut;e of the word 'reckles:::;', follow-
ing the word 'intentional', meant to hold the driver 
liable for a lesser degree of negligence than an 
'intentional' act. A driver may accomplish the 
same result, ho\vever~ by driving in a manner or 
at a speed that is dangerous (reckless). and yet do 
so with no special purpo,;;e to injure his guest or 
himself or intent other than to be going wherever 
or however he pleases, regardless of results. 
The word 'reckless' as used in this Statute 
is, in my opinion, not used as synonomous with 
'a conscious indifference', 'willful disregard', or 
'wanton disregard' of the rights of a guest." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Shoemaker 
vs. Floor, 117 Utah 434, 217 P. 2d 382, at page 384, sets 
forth the basis on which an Idaho guest action must 
be considered when heard in Utah : 
"The principal question, therefore, is whether 
or not the conduct of the defendant as testified 
to by the plaintiff, may be found by the trier of 
the facts, to constitute 'reckless disregard', of the 
safety of the plaintiff within the means of the 
Idaho Guest Statute, Cases from several juris-
dictions having similarly worded Statutes are 
cited by appellant and respondent in support of 
their respective positions. However, since the 
court is applying the Statuatory Law of Idaho, 
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we must give to such law construction placed 
thereon by the Supreme Court of that f;tate if 
such construction has been made. Appellant's 
contention that 'reckless disregard of the rights 
of others' is equivalent to 'wilful misconduct' as 
used in the Utah Guest Statute, in our opinion 
has been rejected by the Idaho Court." 
In discussing the facts of the Shoemaker case as 
applied to the Idaho Law, the Utah Court says on page 
386: 
"While in several jurisdictions with statutes 
similar in wording to that of Idaho, Defendant 
might have been entitled to a nonsuit under the 
stated facts, the two cited cases from Idaho, 
(Hughes vs. Hudelson, supra, and Dau·son vs. 
Salt Lake Hardware Co., 64 Ida. 666, 130 P. 2d, 
733) convinces us that the question of 'reckless 
disregard for the safety' of the Plaintiff W[).S for 
the trier of the facts." (parenthesis ours) 
Appellant cites a New ~Iexico case in his brief, 
and even though the New :Mexico and the Idaho Guest 
Statutes may be very similar, the Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly adopted the position that the interpretation 
to be placed on the Idaho Statute is the one placed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court, and not that placed by the 
courts of other states having similar statutes. How-
ever, it should also be pointed out that there is one im-
portant distinguishing feature between the K ew :Mexico 
case and the instant case. The New :Mexico case occurred 
at night, wherein the instant case occurred in broad 
daylight. 
Appellant appears to place great reliance upon the 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Idaho case of Turner vs. Purdem, 77 Ida. 130, 289 P. 2d 
608, ( 1955). 
The fact situation in the Turner case was as fol-
lows: At about 9:30 P. M. in the month of October, 
Turner was riding in an automobile driven by Purdem, 
which was travelling at a speed of 45 to 50 MPH. At 
the same time one Dye was driving a farm tractor towing 
a potato-digger in the same direction that the Purdem 
car was travelling. The tractor had a white light 4~ 
in. diameter located so that it shone slightly downward 
but at a level above the potato digger. There were no 
yellow or red lights, or reflectors on the rear of the 
tractor, nor lights or reflectors of any kind on the rear 
of the potato digger. When Purdem was one-half mile 
behind the potato digger he saw the white light, and he 
testified that he did not see the light any more until 
he was within 25 or 30 feet of the digger; at this time 
he did not have time to apply his brakes to avoid collid-
ing with the potato digger and injuring Turner. 
In the Turner case the trial court granted Purdem 
a non-suit. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court. The facts of the Turner 
case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case in almost every important particular. 
First: The Turner collision took place at night 
under windy and somewhat dusty conditions. 
Second: Neither the tractor nor the potato digger 
was equipped with red lights or red reflectors, the only 
visible light being a white light on the tractor that was 
pointing downward. 
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In the case now before the Court, the collision took 
place on a dry road, on a clear, bright day with no ob-
structions of any kind to appellant's vision. Testimony 
in the instant case further shows that Karen Wright, 
the person sitting next to the appellant, saw the tractor 
and hay-rack two city blocks away, (113); that the boy 
on the tractor saw the automobile as the tractor came 
upon the highway, and at that time he estimated the 
distance of the automobile from the tractor to be about 
one-half mile (103). The clear distance at which the 
tractor and hay-rack could have been seen by appellant 
was from thirty-five one-hundreths to fifty-five one-
hundreths of a mile (71). 
Third: There was no factor of high or dangerous j . 
speed in the Turner case. The only evidence being that 
the Defendant was driving 45 to 50 MPH, which was 
apparently within the speed limit for the area concerned. 
In the case now before the court the evidence shows 
that the appellant was driving 70 ~IPH shortly before 
the impact (112), that he did not reduce his speed upon 
approaching the tractor and hay-rack, and that only at 
the last possible moment did he swerve to attempt to 
pass the hay-rack on the right (11±), and in doing so 
the car struck the hay-rack, overturned and came to 
rest on its top in the barrow pit son1e 235 feet down 
the highway. It is subn1itted that the facts of the case 
now before the court can be distinguished from the 
facts of the Turner vs. Purdmn case in every important 
particular. 
Appellant suggests in his brief that perhaps he is 
guilty only of momentary inattention. An examination 
10 
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of the acts of the appellant shows that he was guilty 
of a 'reckless disregard' of the safety of others. His 
actions clearly show he was operating his automobile 
exactly as he pleased, regardless of the consequences 
to others. Such a course of action can hardly be called 
'momentary inattention'. 
In broad daylight an object as large as a hay-rack 
and tractor came upon the highway when the appellant 
was about two city blocks or approximately 1000 to 
1200 feet away. The slow moving tractor and hay-rack, 
which the evidence shows was moving at the speed of 
4 to 5 MPH, had time to get fully upon the highway and 
travel down the highway a distance of 80 feet and was 
almost stopped at the time of impact. Meanwhile, appel-
lant did nothing except to continue at full speed ahead, 
then when he was almost on top of the hay-rack, he at-
tempted to pass on the right and lost control of his 
automobile. The evidence is without dispute, that even 
at 70 MPH, including reaction time, appellant could 
have brought his automobile to a complete stop within 
a distance of 282 feet (172). 
The evidence further shows that the distance travel-
led by the tractor from the point of its entry upon the 
highway to the point where it was at the time of the 
collision would be at least 83 feet, (Plaintiff's exhibit 
D), and the tractor moving at a speed of 4 MPH would 
take 13-5/6 seconds to cover the distance of 83 feet, or 
if the tractor were moving at the speed of 5 MPH it 
would take 10.8 seconds to cover the distance of 83 feet. 
(The figures on the speed of the tractor are taken from 
page 91 of the record.) Then taking into consideration 
11 
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the speed of the automobile at 70 MPH which equals 
102 feet per second it is apparent that Defendant's 
automobile must have been 1407 feet to the north of 
the tractor when the tractor pulled onto the road if the 
tractor were travelling 4 MPH; or 1101 feet to the 
north of the tractor if the tractor were traveling 5 :MPH. 
POINT II 
IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE JURY OBEYED 
THE INSTRUCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DISREGARD THE REMARKS TO WHICH APPEL-
LANT TOOK EXCEPTION, AND IT WAS A PROPER 
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETIOX FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO DENY :MISTRIAL 
The admonition of the court to the jury to disregard 
the remarks complained of in respondent's opening state-
ment protected the rights of the appellant, and it was a 
proper exercise of judicial discretion for the trial court 
to deny a mistrial. 
The trial court admonished the jury to disregard 
the remarks to which appellant had taken exception, and 
directed the jury that the statement had no bearing on 
the facts of the case and should not be regarded by 
them in either their deliberations or in their adjudication 
of the case. (Supplemental record page 6) 
There is a presumption that the jury obeyed the 
instructions of the court to disregard the objectionable 
remarks. The rule is set out in 53 Am. Jur., Section 
505, at page 407, as follows: 
"Since in 1nany cases the effect of ilnproper argu-
ment can be rmnedied by an instruction to the 
12 
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jury to disregard it, the courts generally require 
in order to predicate errors thereon, that an ob-
jection must be made at the time of the improper 
statement, so that an opportunity may be given 
to the attorney making the misstatement and the 
court to rectify the damage. Dependant upon the 
circumstances of the particular case, sometimes 
the mere sustaining of an objection to the im-
proper remark or the mere sustaining of an 
objection together with an admonition to counsel, 
would be sufficient to remove the injurious effect 
thereof." 
In the case of Potter vs Cave, 98 N. W. 589 (Iowa), 
the court stated the rule as follows : 
"It not infrequently happens that in opening 
a case a counsel makes statements of an intention 
to prove matters as to which the evidence is sub-
sequently rejected by the court, and when the 
statement is not unreasonable in itself, but is 
made in good faith we would not hold that error 
was committed even though the court should after-
ward properly exclude the evidence relied upon." 
In the case of Y echout vs. Tesnohlidek, 150 N. W. 
199, at page 200, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted 
the following rule: 
"In making statements to the jury the plain-
tiff is entitled to 'briefly state his claim' and may 
state the evidence by which he expects to sustain 
it (Nebraska Code). In all cases, reasonable 
latitude must be allowed in what the party 'ex-
pects' to prove. The fact that he may fail to 
establish facts which he may have expected to 
prove does not necessarily establish that the 
statement was intentionally false. The incidents 
referred to, even if not proved, were of a trivial 
13 
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matter, not material to a recovery and we cannot 
conceive any prejudice resulting therefrom." 
The rule is stated in 88 C. J. S. at page 399, as fol-
lows: 
" ... and whether an admonition to the jury 
is sufficient to eradicate the prejudicial effect of 
the misconduct is largely a n1atter within the 
discretion of the trial court." 
In the case of Baker 1.iS. The Market-Street Railway, 
11 P. 2d 912, the California court, at page 915, quoted 
the following rule from the previous California case of 
Tingley vs. Times-Mirror, 89 Pac. 1097, 1106, 
"It is only in extreme cases that the court, 
when acting promptly and speaking clearly and 
directly on the subject, cannot, by instructing the 
jury to disregard such matters, correct the im-
propriety of the act of counsel and remove any 
effect his conduct or remarks would otherwise 
have." 
It is submitted that the statenwnt 1nade by respond-
ent's counsel in his opening statmnent, to the effect that 
the parties purchased a six-pack beer, was not a remark 
of such a character as to create an .. extrmne situation" 
that was not readily cured by the ad1nonition of the 
trial court to the jury that the jury should disregard 
such remarks and not consider the1n in their deliber-
ations. Respondent also points out that there was 
never any subsequent reference 1nade to the subject 
throughout the entire three day trial. 
Further, respondent does not concede that a state-
Inent to the effect that the parties of the lawsuit 
purchased a six-pack beer son1e four hours prior to the 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time of collision was a prejudicial statement, even 
though respondent's complaint did not allege intoxication 
on the part of the Appellant. 
In the case of J ally vs. Clements, (Cal.) 82 P. 2d 51, 
the court considered the question of evidence concern-
ing the use of intoxicants by the defendant, where trial 
court refused to submit the question of intoxication to 
the jury in a special interrogatory, and, at page 56, the 
court commented as follows : 
"The extent to which appellant had been 
drinking was a circumstance that the jury had a 
right to consider in deciding whether a proper 
lookout had been kept. There is no claim here 
of appellant having been heavily intoxicated. If 
the liquor had any effect on the attention which he 
gave to the condition of the road in front of him, 
or upon the keenness with which he observed it, 
then the fact that he had taken the drinks was 
still but one ingredient, among other ingredients, 
such, as for example the natural weariness of a 
person who had been without sleep until that 
hour in the 1norning, that the jury may have be-
lieved to have affected the clarity of his observa-
tion and the keenness of his judgment at the time 
of the accident." 
A similar question came before the Colorado 
Supreme Court in the case of Foster vs. Redding, 45 P. 
2d 940, and the Court in ruling on the question, at page 
942, stated as follows: 
"It follows that the rulings on the instructions 
concerning 'wilful and wanton disregard' as dis-
tinct from those elements involved in intoxication, 
though technjcall~T erroneous had the sobriety of 
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the driver been a question of doubt, are here 
totally devoid of prejudice. It is therefore un-
necessary to further examine these rulings 
though we detect no error in them." 
Counsel for the appellant, at the time the objection 
was made to the court concerning the statement of re-
spondent's counsel, asked the court that an explanation 
be made thereof to the jury (Supplemental transcript 
page 2). The court, in making the requested explanation 
to the jury, embodied all of the remarks requested by 
the counsel for the appellant, and it appears that counsel 
for appellant is now in no position to contend that he 
was entitled to a mistrial. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT'S ~IOTIOX TO DISJ\fiSS, 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, AND 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WERE PROPERLY 
DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant's l\Iotion to Dismiss and ~lotion for a 
Directed Verdict, for purposes of the motions, admitted 
the truth of the evidence before the court and jury, to-
gether with all fair, reasonable, and legitilnate inferen-
ces favorable to Respondent. The trial court, under 
the circumstances, had to decide whether there was suf-
ficient evidence to go to the jury, or stated in another 
way, whether there was sufficient eYidence to sustain 
a verdict in the event the jury should find in favor of 
the Respondent. 
The foregoing principles of law haYe been followed 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Sielsen ·rs. 
Hermanson, 109 Ut. 180, 166 P. ~d 536, where the court 
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in reversing a directed verdict said, at page 537 : 
"On a motion by defendant for a directed 
verdict in his favor, the evidence must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff. As it is 
often put, if the evidence is favorable to plaintiff, 
with all reasonable inferences and intendments 
that can be drawn therefrom could sustain a ver-
dict for plaintiff the cause should be submitted 
to the jury." 
A consideration of the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom, in the case now before the court, 
certainly sustains the rulings of the trial court. A driver 
who travels at a speed of 70 MPH, disregards the warn-
ings and protests of a guest, strikes a hay-rack and 
tractor in broad daylight, then careens down the road 
into the barrow pit, overturns several times and comes 
to rest 235 feet from the area of the impact, certainly 
cannot seriously contend that such evidence, together 
with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn there-
from, is insufficient to make out a prima facia case of 
"reckless disregard for the rights of others". 
In the case before the court the trial judge ruled 
that the evidence offered in support of Respondent's 
case was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury; 
and the jury, after hearing all the evidence, found in 
favor of Respondent. The matter was again reviewed 
by the trial judge on Appellant's motion for a new trial, 
and after reconsidering all the evidence, as well as the 
alleged errors of the court, the trial judge denied the 
motion for a new trial permitting the jury's verdict to 
stand. 
Appellant courts have frequently laid down and ad-
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hered to the rule that wherever a verdict is supported 
by substantial evidence it should be regarded as pre-
sumably correct, and strength is added to this rule where 
the cas:e has been reviewed by the trial judge sitting in 
effect as a ninth juror and denying the motion for a 
new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT I·. 
THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATIO~ WAS NOT A 
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AND NEED NOT BE 
NAMED AS A PARTY PLAINTIFF. 
Prior to the time of trial, Appellant made no motion 
to have the Veterans Administration named as a party 
plaintiff although Appellant was advised by Respond-
ent's answer to Interrogatory No. 11, ·which was filed 
on April 8, 1957, some eight months prior to trial, that 
the hospital and medical expenses incurred by Re-
spondent at the Veterans Hospital would be claimed as 
a part of Respondent's damage (page 18 of Transcript 
of Pleadings). Appellant's motion to include the Veter-
ans Administration as an additional party plaintiff was 
made on the second day of trial. 
The court properly ruled as a n1atter of law that 
the Veteran's Ad1ninistration was not a real party in 
interest, and therefore could not properly be joined as 
a party plaintiff. This ruling is supported by a decision 
of the United States Supre1ne Court in the case of the 
United States vs. Standard Oil Company, 332 U.S. 301, 
67 Sup. Court 1604, 91 Law Ed. 206·7, where the United 
States Supre1ne Court had before it a case in which 
the United States was the plaintiff suing for its loss of 
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services of a member of the Armed Forces, who sus-
tained injuries in a traffic accident caused by the wrong-
ful act of an employee of the Standard Oil Company. 
The serviceman was unable to perform his duties for 
29 days, and the Government instituted suit to recover 
the wages paid to the soldier and the reasonable value 
of the medical care furnished him in connection with 
the treatment of his injuries. The Supreme Court held 
that the matter of the Government being able to sue for 
the damages resulting to it from a tortious injury to a 
member of the Armed Forces was a matter of fiscal 
policy. Since Congress had enacted no legislation pro-
viding the government with a right of action against 
third persons whose wrongful acts cause injury to mem-
bers of the Armed Forces resulting in damages to the 
government, the court held that the government had no 
right of action for such damages. 
Based upon the foregoing case which is the leading 
case on the subject, it is submited that there is no legal 
basis upon which the Veterans Administration could 
sue a wrongdoer for the value of services rendered to 
a veteran, and it would have been error for the court 
to have granted Appellant's motion to name the Veterans 
Administration a party plaintiff. 
POINT V 
IT WAS ENTIRELY PROPER FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO AD.MIT EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
RESPONDENT'S OBLIGATION, IN THE EVENT 
OF HIS RECOVERY FROM APPELLANT, TO PAY 
THE VETERANS AD11INISTRATION FOR 1\IEDI-
CAL SERVICE RENDERED HIM IN THE VETER-
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ANS HOSPITAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the majority 
rule which holds that the injured person may recover in 
full from a wrong-doer regardless of anything that the 
injured person may receive from a "collateral source" 
unconnected with the wrong-doer. In the case of 1l1artin 
vs. Sheffield, 112 Ut. 478, 189 P. 2d 127, the Court 
adopted the following rule which is found at page 131: 
"We therefore note another contention of 
the appellant. He argues that plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover for loss of wages during the 
time she was disabled for the reason she was paid 
by her employer for those particular days. The 
undisputed evidence is that she obtained com-
pensation by drawing on her accmnulative sick-
leave. In view of the fact that she lost the bene-
fit of her sick-leave for future needs, under the 
facts of this case, the Court did not misdirect the 
jury on the issue of loss of incon1e during the 
period she was unable to work." 
The foregoing rule adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court is consistent with the rule set forth in the Re-
statement of Torts, Section 920, Subsection (e), at page 
434, as follows: 
"Where a person has been disabled and hence 
cannot work but derives an incon1e during the 
period of disability fr01n a contract of insurance 
or fr01n a contract of e1nploy1nent which requires 
pay1nent during such period, his inc01ne is not 
the result of earnings but of previous contractual 
arrangements made for his own benefit, not the 
tortfeasor's. Likewise, the da1nages for loss of 
earnings are not di1ninished by the fact that his 
employer or a third person n1ade gifts to him 
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even though these may have been given because 
of his incapacity. Further, he may be able to 
recover for the reasonable value of medical 
treatment or other services made necessary by 
the injury although these have been donated to 
him." 
The "collateral source" principle was examined ex-
haustively in the case of Hudson vs. Lazarus, 217 Fed. 
2d 344, (1946). In that case, as in the case now before 
the court, the injured party received treatment at a 
Veterans' Hospital, but with this distinction-he did 
not make any assignment of any portion of what he 
might have been able to recover from a third party to 
the Veterans Administration. At that time, the Veter-
ans Administration's regulation under which the Re-
spondent's obligation was concurred had not be adopted. 
This fact is pointed out by the court in their opinion, 
at page 34 7 note 11, in which the Veterans Administra-
tion Regulation, under which Respondent's assignment 
was made, is discussed. The issue before the court in 
the Hudson case was as follows: 
In a personal injury action may the plaintiff 
recover from the defendant tort-feasor the value 
of all reasonable and necessary hospital services 
furnished to the plaintiff without a charge by a 
naval hospital because he was a Veteran' The 
court held that the 'collateral source' principle 
applied, and that recovery would be permitted 
for the reasonable value of such hospital services 
even though there was no obligation on the part 
of the plaintiff to reimburse the Veterans Ad-
ministration. 
The court at page 347 stated as follows: 
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"It is generally well settled that the fact that 
the plaintiff may receive compensation from a 
collateral source (or free medical care) is no de-
fense to an action for damages against the person 
causing the injury." Citing Sainsbury vs. 
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 4th Cir. (1950), 
183 Fed. 2d 548, at page 550, 21 ALR. 2d 266. 
In Plank vs. Summers, 203 ~Id. 552, 102 A. 2d 262, 
which was cited by the court in Hudson vs. Lazarus, the 
same rule applied where the court held: that in an 
action against a civilian for injuries to members of the 
Navy the value of medical and hospital services furnished 
the plaintiffs gratuitously by the Federal Government 
as a part of their compensation for services rendered 
were proper items for the jury's consideration in deter-
mining the amount of damages to be paid the plaintiffs 
by the defendant. 
In the case of Caudill vs. rictory Carriers, Inc., 
(D. C. Va.) 149 Fed. Supp. 11, the court held that an 
injured seamen was properly entitled to introduce evi-
dence as to proper future 1nedical expenses even though 
the injured sean1an was a member of the arn1ed forces 
at the tin1e of injury and ·would be entitled to free treat-
ment at a Veterans Hospital. 
The most recent ruling on this subject \Yas decided 
in ~Iarch, 1958, by the ±th Circuit of the U. S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in the rase of Rayfield rs. Lau-rence, 
253 Fed. 2d 209. In this case the principal question be-
fore the court was the Defendant's cont~mtion that the 
instruction to the effect that if the jury found the de-
fendant liable it could consider, an1ong other elements 
of dmnage, the fair and reasonable Yalue of the hospital 
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and medical services rendered the plaintiff at the Naval 
Hospital, even though the plaintiff may not have actually 
expended any money for such hospital care and medical 
services. The court, at page 212, held that the instruc-
tion was a corect statement of law, and at page 213, the 
court stated the rule as follows: 
"It is well settled in most jurisdictions, in-
cluding Virginia where this accident occured, 
that an injured person may recover in full from 
a wrongdoer regardless of any compensation he 
may receive from a collateral source." 
In view of the law established by the cited cases as 
well as by the Restatement of Torts to the effect that the 
injured party may recover the value of the services 
rendered by the Veterans Hospital, even though there 
may be no obligation on his part to reimburse the Veter: 
ans Administration, it certainly should be clear that the 
court properly allowed evidence of R:espondent's obliga-
tion to pay the value of such services to the Veterans 
Administration in the event of his recovery. 
POINT VI 
CONSIDERING THE PERI\fANENT NATURE 
OF THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY RESPONDENT, 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT EXCES-
SIVE, AND THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OF ~rHE VETERANS ADMINISTRA-
TION HOSPITAL BILL. 
It is apparently appellant's contention as rais:ed in 
his Point VI that it was error to permit the jury to 
know that if Respondent recovered from Appellant he 
was obligated to pay to the Veterans Administration 
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the sum of $3300.75 for medical treatment rendered 
the respondent at the Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake 
City. Appellant does not deny that the treatment was 
necesasry, or that it was rendered to the Respondent. 
Appellant cites In re Behm's Estate, 117 Ut. 151, 
213 P. 2d 657, (1950), as authority for the proposition 
that Respondent cannot assign to the Veterans Ad-
ministration a share of the proceeds he may recover 
from a tortfeasor. It is submitted that the opinion in 
the Behm case does not support such a proposition, but 
on the contrary is authority in full support of the action 
taken between the Respondent and the Veterans Ad-
ministration as is shown in the following language of 
the court, at page 662 : 
"In the first cited case, (Richards vs. National 
Transportation Co., 285 N. Y. 870), the injured 
person assigned to a hospital a share of any pro-
ceeds he should acquire from any settlement or 
judgment to be paid by the tortfeasor. The court 
recognized that under the la'v of the State of 
New York the cause of action was non-assignable, 
but held that the assignment of a share of the 
proceeds was enforceable in equity." (parenthesis 
ours) 
In the Behm case the following paragraph inunediat-
ely succeeds the quotation in Appellant's brief quoting 
from page 663 of the case : 
"Under the rules announced, the assignment 
by the respondent of the proceeds, if any, that 
should be recovered by the n1alpractice suit in-
stituted by appellant, is valid and enforceable.'' 
"rhe agremnent made by respondent with the Yeter-
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ans Administration Hospital is contained in plaintiff's 
Exhibit I, as follows: 
"I, Gary R. Wood, in consideration of the 
foregoing Reassignment, do hereby agree to re-
imburse the Veterans Administration from any 
damages that may be recovered in any action or 
settlement incident to the injuries for which hos-
pital care and treatment was furnished, to the 
extent of the total reasonable charges for such 
hospital care, medical, surgical, clinical treatment 
and other charges received by him, less the pro-
portionate share of said Veterans Administration 
for all costs, fees or other charges occasioned 
thereof." 
The only basis upon which appellant contends that 
Respondent's damages are excessive is that the verdict 
was influenced by the fact that the jury was advised 
that Respondent was obligated to pay the Veterans Ad-
ministration for the cost of his hospitalization in ac-
cordance with the agreement contained in plaintiff's Ex-
hibit I. 
Appellant avoids any reference to Respondent's in-
juries in making the contention that damages are ex-
cesive. The record shows Respondent was hospitalized 
at :Montpelier, Idaho, from the date of injury on N ovem_:-
ber 3, 1956, to November 13, 1956, and at the Salt Lake 
Veterans Hospital from November 13, 1956, until May 
16, 1957, (plaintiff's Exhibit G.) Respondent had to pay 
the Bear Lake Hospital $307.65 and his physician and 
surgeon $192.35 (plaintiff's Exhibit E), in addition to 
the amount which he agreed to pay the Veterans Ad-
ministration in the event of his recovery. 
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The medical evidence concerning the Respondent's 
injuries shows that he sustained severe lacerations, be-
ginning above the knee on the right leg, and extending 
down through the bend of the knee and on to the extreme 
right side of the leg (184, 185); that he had a permanent 
injury to the peroneal nerve and the tibial nerve (183, 
194); that the nerve injuries resulted in a 50% loss of 
motor or muscle power in the right leg; that he has a 
loss of sensation down the back part of the right leg, 
over the heel and up the sole of the foot; that the ankle 
was stiffened as a result of a loss of power, (195); and 
that he had to undergo surgery, including skin grafts. 
The attending surgeon stated, that in his opinion, Re-
spondent had suffered a 50% loss of function of the 
right leg, and that this was a permanent loss of function. 
These injuries, together with this loss of bodily function, 
were sustained by a young man 25 years of age. Certainly 
it cannot be said that a verdict of $15,510.00 was ex-
cessive when $3810.75 of the verdict was for medical 
expenses, nor can it be said that the jury was influenced 
by passion or prejudice in awarding this an1ount to a 
young man who had suffered the pain and disability of 
such severe and permanent injuries. 
POINT VII 
POLICE OFFICER ALVI~ \Y. FOULGER \VAS 
PROPERLY QUALIFIED AS ~\X EXPERT \YIT-
NESS, AND HIS EXPERT TESTIMOXY \VAS 
ENTIRELY :MATERIAL AND RELEYAXT TO THE 
ISSUES OF THE CASE. 
The 'evidence shows that Police Sergeant ~\lYin \V. 
Foulger was qualified as an expert witness by Yirtue of 
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his eight years experience as a traffic officer on the 
Ogden City police force, by his specialized training at 
three different safety and traffic schools conducted by 
the National Safety Council, and further by his special 
studies concerning the scientific basis for evaluating 
speed on the basis of skid marks. (165) The California 
Appellate court in the case of Wells Truckways vs. 
Cebrian, 265 P. 2d 557, at page 564, states the rule that 
has been adopted by practically all appellate courts 
concerning the qualifications of a witness to testify as 
an expert: 
"The qualification of a witness to testify as 
an expert is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and where there is no showing 
of the clear abuse of that discretion, the ruling 
of that court will not be disturbed upon appeal. 
Where the witness has disclosed a sufficient 
knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to 
go to the jury the question of the degree of his 
knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence 
than its admisibility." Citing People vs. Haeussler, 
260 P. 2d 8; Pitt vs. Southern Pacific Company, 
9 P. 2d 273; 10 Cal Jur. 963 sec. 220. 
The Appellant objects to the denial of his motion 
to strike Officer Foulger's testimony on the ground 
that there was no evidence of brake marks at the scene 
of the collision, and that for this reason there was no basis 
for the answers of the officer to a hypothetical question 
regarding the number of feet in which an automobile 
could be brought to a stop from specified speed under 
conditions similar to those faced by Appellant. Appellant, 
apparently, misinterpreted the purpose of Officer 
Foulger's testimony. The officer's testimony was not 
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introduced for the purpose of proving any specific speed 
on the part of the Appellant, but was introduced for the 
purpose of estabishing that if Appellant had made any 
attempt to stop when he saw, or could have seen the trac-
tor and hay-rack coming onto the road, he would have 
had ample time and distance in which to stop. The great 
distance at which the tractor and hay-rack could have 
been seen from the automobile at the time they came 
upon the hard surface high,vay was testified to by 
Miss Wright, who was riding in the front seat of 
the automobile (113), and also by :\Ir. \Vallentine who 
was riding on the tractor (103). 
Appellant is bound by the well-established rule that 
when the physical facts and circumstances are such that 
he could, by looking, have seen the object of danger, it 
cannot be said that he looked and did not see it. Under 
such circumstances, it will be presumed that he either 
failed to look or that he failed to take any heed to what 
he saw. 
All of the objections made by Appellant to Officer 
Foulger's testimony are objections that go to the weight 
of the testimony and have no bearing upon its adinisibil-
ity. The court, therefore, properly denied Defendant's 
motion to strike this testimony. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT'S INSTRFCTIOXS TO THE JURY 
PROVIDED THE JURY \YITH A FAIR AXD 
LEGALLY CORRECT BASIS FOR CONSIDERIKG 
AND DELIBl~RATING UPON _.:\.LL ISSUES OF THE 
CASE. 
The general rule regarding the 1nanner in which an 
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appellate court should evaluate the instructions of a 
trial court is stated in 89 C. J. 8., Trial Sec. 430, at 
page 11, as follows : 
"Provided they are consistent with each other, 
all instructions given in a case should be read 
together as a whole, each in the light of the 
others, and this rule with respect to the con-
struction of instructions as a whole applies to 
special charges given in the request of either 
party. Accordingly, instructions are not subject 
to exception where, when construed as a whole, 
they properly state the law, and this is particular-
ly true where the jury are told that all instructions 
are to be considered as a series or as a whole." 
(Italics ours) 
The court's Instruction No. 31 specifically directed 
the jury that all of the instructions, though numbered 
separately, were to be considered as one connected whole, 
and the jury was advised that they were not to single 
out any one instruction and ignore the others. 
It is submitted, that based upon the evidence, the 
court properly denied Appellant's requests No. 1 and 
No. 2 as these requests were an equivalent to a directed 
verdict. 
Appellant objects to the failure of the trial court 
to give his request No. 6, but an examination of court's 
Instruction No. 12 reveals that the court gave his re-
quest No. 6 verba tum with the sole exception that the 
word, "misconduct", in the Appellant's request, was 
replaced with the word, "disregard", by the court, in 
order that the instruction would conform to the lan-
guage of the Idaho Statute. 
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· The court's instructions, construed as a whole, fairly 
and completely present the matter to the jury, and they 
contain all of the elements that should be considered 
by the jury under the Idaho law. The fact that Ap-
pellant, in his brief, fails to specifically designate errors 
in a single instruction, that he claims to be erroneous, 
indicates that Appellant can find no error in the court's 
charge to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The court properly submitted the case to the jury, 
as the Respondent had proved every element necessary 
to establish his cause of action under the Idaho Guest 
Statute. The evidence on the n1anner in which the Appel-
lant operated his automobile demonstrated clearly that 
Appellant had a reckless disregard for the rights and 
safety of the Respondent riding in his autmnobile. 
The remainder of the Appellant's alleged errors 
relate to matters that were within the judicial discretion 
of the trial judge. In regard to these n1atters it is 
submitted that the trial judge gave thoughtful and care-
ful consideration to each of then1 and rendered his de-
cision in accordance with the law. 
We respectfully subn1it that the judg1nent should 
be affirmed. 
l(UXZ & l(UNZ 
David S. I{unz 
Attorneys for Rcspoudeut 
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